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Long after the American revolution, social movements played important roles in the
development of the United States as a nation, helping to define and express identi-
ties that were both larger and smaller than the nation itself. Movements that were
founded to advance certain goals — temperance, religious conversion, or the aboli-
tion of slavery — consciously helped to shape and define “Americanness” and
therefore played an important role in constituting the nation itself. Movements
inspired by Protestantism have been a particular force. To outsiders — immigrants,
the irreligious, non-Protestants, or foreigners — American social movements sought
to impose American civilization on peoples, lands, and nations outside their cultural
or political domain, all justified as a mission sanctioned and supervised by God.
Longtemps après la fin de la Guerre de l’indépendance, les mouvements sociaux ont
joué d’importants rôles dans le développement des États-Unis en tant que nation,
aidant à définir et à exprimer des identités à la fois plus grandes et plus petites que
la nation même. Les mouvements voués à la défense de certaines causes — la
tempérance, la conversion religieuse ou l’abolition de l’esclavage — ont consciem-
ment aidé à façonner et à définir l’« américanité » et ont donc joué un rôle de pre-
mier plan dans l’édification de la nation. Les mouvements inspirés du protestantisme
ont été particulièrement forts. Aux étrangers — les immigrants, les irréligieux, les
non-protestants ou les étrangers —, les mouvements sociaux américains cherchèrent
à imposer la civilisation américaine aux gens, territoires et nations hors de leur
sphère culturelle ou politique, tout cela au nom d’une mission sanctionnée et super-
visée par Dieu.
HISTORIANS OF UNITED STATES history tend to tell the stories of social
movements as local ones. But these narratives, of movement activists imbued
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by reforming fervour to change themselves, their cities, their country, and the
world, reflect motives and identities that weave the local and the global in sug-
gestive ways. By what threads are the local stories of social movements in par-
ticular nation-states connected to a global fabric? With what ideologies do
social movement activists influence national questions of belonging and
exclusion? Did the people who imagined, led, and populated these movements
think globally and act locally, as current bumper stickers exhort? Finally, what
relation do social movements have to the nation, when we employ a more crit-
ical lens to examine the construction and creation of them both?
The short answer to these questions is simple: long after the American
revolution, a social movement that literally created the United States, social
movements played important roles in the development of the United States
as a nation, helping to define and express identities that were both larger and
smaller than the nation itself. During the early nineteenth century, not only
were the countrys boundaries loosely formed, contested, and complex, but
Americans sense of themselves as a people had not emerged even to the
extent it has in our own time. That process took many years, and it was
assisted by the numerous social movements that characterized American
civic life. Movements founded to advance certain goals  temperance, for
example, or religious conversion, or the abolition of slavery  consciously
helped to shape and define Americanness and therefore played an impor-
tant role in constituting the nation itself.
I want to direct a wide lens to early nineteenth-century social movements
to show how they helped define what came to be thought of as a uniquely
American mission. Further, I argue that the ways in which antebellum Amer-
icans, through social movements, articulated the meaning of their time,
place, and people continue to inform how we understand the American
nation itself. Here the perspectives of outsiders  both within the United
States and internationally  provide the distance from the individual threads
of this story that gives sharper focus to the pattern of the national fabric.
What we see through this lens is that social movements are far more deeply
woven into Americans ideas about their nation than those movements nar-
rower goals might suggest.
First a warning: embracing the current fascination with globalization has
special dangers for the history of social movements. After all, the neo-liberal
and anti-ideological assumptions that pervade many studies of globalization
tend to erase social movements from serious consideration. Efforts by peo-
ple to join together to protect and transform their communities, schools,
unions, physical environments, or government policies or to combat imperi-
alism, racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty in their many local forms
become merely local, backwards, provincial, and, worst of all, destined to
defeat. That movements opposed to the institutions that represent global cap-
italism have arisen as prominent sources of social unrest is indicative of this
frustration. The rhetoric of a global village, one dominated by markets and
financial elites (international alliances that are quite different from those
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Marx envisioned), can make peoples efforts to control their lives, to work
for greater justice in the distribution of wealth, and to challenge the domi-
nance of some groups by others seem puny, hopeless, and irrelevant.1
Historians tell and interpret stories, however, and, in spite of global elites
and the Internet, the stories of most people are grounded not simply in their
nation-states but in families, communities, tribes, cultures, folk, and the
social movements that they launch from each of these. The nation is a politi-
cal jurisdiction, a provider of legal citizenship, and a sponsor of wars, domes-
tic programmes, propaganda, and complex loyalties, but it has never been the
only way in which people understand themselves or choose to act in the
world. Historians need to convey those stories at the same time as we bring
our particular analyses to bear on the complex realities that encompass them.
Social scientists work in comparative and trans-national social move-
ments does not, I think, provide historians with the models we need to
address these issues. The nation is far too much a given in this work,
although a few scholars attempt to transcend the central reference in the lib-
eral concept, the claim to access, inclusion, membership, and belonging to
an already given political system.2 Even in social movements that went
beyond national boundaries  international workers movements, bourgeois
womens alliances, pacifist organizations, or environmental efforts, to name
a few  the state (or states) are the central units against which they react,
and whose policy-makers are the targets of their appeals. Thus, although
much new work among social movement scholars is comparative, it fails to
elucidate historical processes that shaped the nation itself.
Secondly, issues that many historians deem fundamental are considered
by many social movement theorists merely as variables in models of organi-
zation, membership, and political practice. For example, while scholars note
Americans high church membership, they are unconcerned with what com-
pels people to organize around religiously based social change; churches
become, along with print shops and restaurants, supportive organizations
in the charts of organizational life.3 In general, social movement analysis
seeks to establish models that will help explain why contemporary move-
ments emerge and what forms they take. While this work offers one set of
1 For an example of this perspective, see Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Under-
standing Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999).
2 Evelina Dagnino, Culture, Citizenship, and Democracy: Changing Discourses and Practices of the
Latin American Left, in Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar, eds., Cultures of
Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements (Boulder, Colo.: West-
view, 1998), p. 51.
3 Hanspeter Kriesi, The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Move-
ment and Cross-National Comparison, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald,
eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures,
and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 152. See, too, Naomi
Rosenthal and Michael Schwartz, Sponteneity and Democracy in Social Movements, in Bert Klan-
dermans, ed., International Social Movement Research: Social Movement Organizations in Europe
and the United States, vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989).
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ways to examine social movements across national boundaries, it does not
inquire deeply into what role social movements play in peoples lives, how
movements help define the complex relationships among individuals, civic
life, the state, and social change. Nor does it ask how social movements are
themselves constitutive of nation-formation in particular times and places.
Notions of membership and belonging, pivotal to understanding national
identities, are also central to the histories of social movements and the soci-
etal ills they confront. Like nationalism, social movements help define and
express identity: as Leila Rupp puts it in her new book on the international
womens movement, Understanding how groups define who we are pro-
vides the link necessary to explain how discontented constituencies mobilize
for political action.4 Only people who believe that they have claims on a
society, who consider themselves, in some sense, citizens, form and join
movements to change it. These activists are not necessarily bearers of the
full privileges of citizenship, but they claim and assert the right to be heard
by those who are. Thus the word nation itself evokes complicated questions
of belonging, a mix of place, people, race/ethnicity, language, religion, legal
systems, governmental policies, and relationships with whomever is not
us. Defining each of these has been a source of struggle and contestation in
the United States, which has grappled from its earliest days with (what some
believed were) limitless boundaries, deep divisions as to racial and religious
definitions of the people, and contrasts, conflicts, and overlaps between
the law of the nation and that of a particular state. Indeed, the confusing
nature of American citizenship has made the evolution of a national identity
extremely untidy, since it involved a system of multiple states and sets of
laws. Certainly the federal constitution established one framework for citi-
zenship (as native-born or naturalized members of the U.S.), but states
provided another, and the dance between the two continues to the present.5
Antebellum social reformers thought of themselves as members of com-
munities both smaller and larger than a nation. If we take seriously what they
said about their newly founded country, it was a federation of states, and it
was as members of states that they first measured their sense of belonging.
Even when they formed a federal government, Americans were reluctant to
call it a national one. Without denying the importance of rituals and insti-
tutions that worked to reinforce a national identity, the amorphousness of the
nation took many forms and lasted well beyond the first decades: recall Rob-
ert E. Lees conclusion at the start of the Civil War that his greater loyalty
lay with Virginia and thus with the Confederacy; the federal governments
first reference to the national forces rather than the state troops in the Civil
4 Leila J. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 7.
5 Individual states mostly defined the rights of citizens through the nineteenth century, determining (at
least until the Reconstruction and woman suffrage amendments partially restrained them) who could
vote and sometimes permitting immigrants who were not American citizens to do so.
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War Enrollment Act of 1863; and the system of burying Union soldiers by
state in the cemetery at Gettysburg.6 If the Civil War resolved, as Lincolns
Gettysburg Address put it, that this nation, under God, shall have a new
birth of freedom, it was only obvious after the fact. On this level, antebel-
lum Americans thought small, and local.
At the same time, as the Gettysburg address also suggests, many Ameri-
cans thought big, and global. For them, the crucial identity that bound them
to one another, that spurred them to join social movements, and that, in fact,
defined their national mission, was as Christians. In describing the vice and
misery suffered by New Yorks poor, moral reformer and urban missionary
Margaret Prior appealed not to her fellow Americans but to the Christians
in our land.7 To lawyer Stephen Colwell, it was the Christians of the
United States [who] have received from their Fathers the most important
trust ever committed to men. The political institutions of this country,
springing from Christian liberality, Christian civilization and intelligence ...
are placed in their hands....8 The American Peace Society referred not to
national boundaries, but to an end to war in Christendom.9 Perhaps only
distance, whether of time or place or identity, can furnish the view that
makes this evident: in the United States, the dialectic between politics and
religion has been so tightly woven as to be most visible to the irreligious or
to foreigners. It was to de Tocqueville a form of Christianity which I cannot
better describe by styling it a democratic and republican religion ... [F]rom
the beginning, politics and religion contracted an alliance which has never
been dissolved.10 I do not know, he admitted, whether all Americans
have a sincere faith in their religion  for who can search the human heart?
 but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensible to the maintenance of
republican institutions.11
“The Science of Christian Government”
With this loyalty to Protestantism in the forefront, the first generation to
have reached maturity in the United States formed social movements.
6 John Whitelay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to America (New York: Free Press,
1987), p. 51. The ambiguous relationship to the federal government, and therefore to the idea of a
nation, is still pervasive, of course. Witness recent debates over welfare magnet laws, in which states
compete to maintain higher levels of public support for their citizens without inviting those of other
states to migrate there. Interestingly, the court decision that overturned these regulations was based on
the constitutional prohibition intended to prevent states from refusing entry to African Americans.
7 Quoted in Nancy Cott, et al., Roots of Bitterness, 2nd ed. (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1996), p. 201.
8 Stephen Colwell, The Position of Christianity in the United States (1854), in David Brion Davis,
ed., Antebellum American Culture: An Interpretive Anthology (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co.,
1979), p. 220.
9 Quoted in Clifford S. Griffin, Their Brothers’ Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United States,
1800–1865 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1960), p. 113.
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1980), vol. 1, p. 300.
11 Ibid., pp. 305306.
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Inspired by the work of British evangelicals who had organized to oppose
the tide of infidelity and the waves of licentiousnss among the working
classes,12 some Americans rather reluctantly overcame denominational loy-
alties to form the benevolent empire. In the United States, the first national
organizations were the American Bible, Tract, and Temperance Societies,
the American Home Missionary Society, the American Sunday School
Union, and the American Colonization Society. It was to mold a nation,
writes historian Clifford Griffin, that the trustees of the Lord formed and
ran their societies, established their thousands of auxiliaries, and sent out
their hundreds of agents, missionaries, and colporteurs.13 Indeed, the com-
petitiveness, local patriotism, and defensiveness of turf that surrounded the
founding of these organizations closely resemble the struggles that are tradi-
tionally associated with nation-building.14 Even when they stressed more
immediate and local goals (for instance, converting a single sinner or acquir-
ing another name on a temperance pledge), participants in these social
movements were deeply engaged in how the nation itself developed and how
Americans ever since have expressed patriotism, imperialism, their sense of
moral righteousness, and the boundaries of legitimate demands for social
change at home and abroad. Although there were skirmishes over the nature
of the relationship, for most American social reformers, Christianity and
nationalism were inseparable, and it was in their organizational life that
religious zeal is perpetually warmed ... by the fires of patriotism.15 Indeed,
some, especially in New England, implicitly offered their own definition of
the nation when they spoke of themselves as probably the last peculiar peo-
ple which God means to form, and the last great empire which he means to
erect before the return of Christ.16
Torn between optimism and fear for their new country, antebellum Ameri-
cans became social activists in numbers and with an intensity that have not
been surpassed before or since. They filled the churches of the Second Great
Awakening of the 1820s and 1830s, built a multitude of organizations, and
expressed utter confidence that they could, and were entitled to, transform
the world. Their social movements had local, national, and international
agendas. Closest to home, thousands of middle-class Protestants organized
to alleviate poverty, which they saw as an essentially moral condition. A tra-
dition of giving relief to the needy merged with a newer effort to transform
the poor themselves, as women and men tramped through the streets of
urban slums bestowing their lessons on the poor, foreign, and fallen. Deeply
12 Quoted in Steven Mintz, Moralists and Modernizers: America’s Pre-Civil War Reformers (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 54.
13 Griffin, Their Brothers’ Keepers, p. 99.
14 See ibid., chap. 2.
15 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, p. 306.
16 Quoted in Martin E. Marty, Pilgrims in their own Land: 500 Years of Religion in America (Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1984), p. 181.
The Nations Mission: Social Movements and Nation-Building 331
ingrained (and, throughout American history, astonishingly consistent)
notions of the worthy and unworthy poor pervaded this work. Thus, the
Female Missionary Society for the Poor in the City of New York was formed
in 1818 for those who, either on account of their poverty, their wickedness
or their ignorance, are destitute of the common ordinances of the Gospel.17
The very names of relief societies, such as Rochesters Home for Friendless
and Virtuous Females, Chicagos Erring Womans Refuge, and the Penitent
Female Refuge in Boston, signalled reformers focus on the moral circum-
stances of the poor.
The national and international implications of their work were never far
from reformers thoughts or actions, though individuals worked on different
fronts. Some focused explicitly on the threat that the federal government
would be entirely secular, seeing in education, missionary activities, and laws
enforcing the Christian sabbath a path to national salvation. Their oft-
expressed commitment to religious liberty rarely included the right to be irre-
ligious, and many leaders considered it the governments responsibility to
ensure the nations piety. Henry Boardman noted with alarm that From the
close of General Washingtons administration in 1797, to the inauguration of
General Harrison, there was not more than one message to Congress, or inau-
gural address, in which the Christian religion was distinctly recognized, and
he was far from alone.18 But when antebellum Americans referred to having
established a sisterhood of reforms or to their country as a chosen one,
they did not see their work as limited by mere national boundaries.
Christianity has, since its earliest days, been an expansionist religion, and
it found in American reformers those who would willingly build their empire
one convert at a time. Although they disagreed about the details, most social
reformers of the day shared prominent Calvinist minister Lyman Beechers
confidence that this nation is, in the providence of God, destined to lead the
way in the moral and political emancipation of the world.19 In this tradition
American social reformers, acting as Christians and only implicitly as repre-
sentatives of the American state, exported their religious and social teach-
ings along with their notions of individual rights and citizenship. The social
movements that emerged in this context, including temperance, moral
reform, antislavery, home and foreign missions, conversion of Jews and
Catholics, missions to the heathen, and relief of the poor, expressed a
17 Female Missionary Society for the Poor in the City of New York, Constitution (1818), p. 7. For a
discussion of this in a comparative perspective, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Why is Poverty a Public
Problem? Rhetorics of Obligation in American Social Policy, in Michael B. Katz and Christoph
Sachße, eds., The Mixed Economy of Social Welfare: Public/ Private Relations in England, Germany,
and the United States, the 1870’s to the 1930’s (Baden-Baden, 1996), pp. 2550.
18 Quoted in John R. Bodo, The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812–1848 (Philadelphia: Porcu-
pine Press, 1980 [1954]), p. 35. See also An Inquiry into the Moral and Religious Character of the
American Government (1838).
19 Lyman Beecher, Plea for the West (New York: Arno, 1977 [1835]), pp. 1011.
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range of political and social goals, but they all reflected a consensus among
American Protestants about what were coming to be considered middle-class
values, a distinctive political culture, and a definition of national identity
that was intrinsically Protestant. The voluntary society is peculiar to mod-
ern times, and almost to our own age, wrote the leading American mission-
ary, Rufus Anderson, in an 1837 article entitled The Time for the Worlds
Conversion Come. Like our own form of government, working with per-
fect freedom over a broad continent, it is among the great results of the
progress of Christian civilization.20 That we call the earliest Anglo-Ameri-
can collaboration on behalf of social reform the benevolent empire should
signal the extent to which movement activists saw their national identities
and goals as subsets of a larger Christian mission; rhetorically committed to
the separation of church and state, they nevertheless founded religiously
based movements that were deeply interwoven with a supposedly secular
political culture. Those few freethinkers (many of them, significantly, not
American-born) who fretted that (in Lyman Beechers approving words) the
rapid and universal extension of civil and religious liberty [was] introduc-
tory to the triumph of universal Christianity, were labelled infidels and dis-
missed from serious consideration.21
These Protestant convictions underscored an American mission that was
equally pertinent in New Yorks slums, among Native Americans, in the
Pacific islands, or in Liberia: they sought to establish Protestant Americans
as the moral arbiters of both the nation and the world. Thus abolitionist
Lewis Tappan founded the American Missionary Association, which viewed
its mandate as spreading the word of evangelical antislavery in such dispar-
ate places as Siam, the West Indies, and Kentucky, as well as among fugitive
slaves in Canada; by the eve of the Civil War the Association had established
antislavery missions in Africa and Turkey as well.22 National borders
made no real distinctions among sinners, in the evangelical worldview. To
the Presbyterians whose work for the Board of Foreign Missions encom-
passed Hawaii, Syria, Burma, Africa, and East Asia, as well as missions to
Native Americans, religion and patriotism were essentially one and the
same; in the words of one historian, Doing the glorious work of the Lord
and winning Indians to the enlightened life-style of middle-class Protestants
appeared quite consistent with doing the work of the United States.23 In
20 Quoted in Andrew F. Walls, The American Dimension in the History of the Missionary Movement,
in Joel A. Carpenter and Wilbert R. Shenk, eds., Earthen Vessels: American Evangelicals and Foreign
Missions, 1880–1980 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eeardmans Publishing Co., 1990), p. 6.
21 Beecher, Plea for the West, p. 9.
22 See Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Lewis Tappan and the Evangelical War Against Slavery (Cleveland: Case
Western Reserve University Press, 1969), pp. 293, 300.
23 Michael C. Coleman, Presbyterian Missionary Attitudes Toward American Indians, 1837–1893 (Jack-
son: University Press of Mississippi, 1985), p. 24. In the 1980s more than 39,000 career Protestant for-
eign missionaries from this continent as well as 30,000 additional short-term workers were employed
overseas by various evangelical societies. See Carpenter and Shenk, eds., Earthen Vessels, p. xii.
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their view, religious and political goals were entirely compatible; in its 1824
Memorial to Congress, for example, the American Board of Commissioners
for Foreign (sic) Missions argued that christianizing American Indians
would allow the government of our nation, and Christians of nearly all
denominations to make amends for the neglect with which these aborigi-
nal tribes have been treated in regard to their civil, moral, and religious
improvement.24 This idea was at the heart of much of American explora-
tion: Now we realize the great vision of Columbus, and reach the Indies by
the West, wrote American missionaries to the west. The barriers of ages
are broken; and the heart of China is now open to the direct influence of
Protestant America.25 The American hopefulness that citizens, acting
together, could reshape their society was infused with both secular meaning
and the absolute faith that, as educator and author Catharine Beecher put it,
The principles of democracy ... are identical with the principles of Chris-
tianity.26 This connection was not lost on King Kamehamehan of Hawaii
for one, who asked visiting American missionaries in 1838 to teach his advi-
sors and himself the science of Christian government.27
Framing Americanness
Numerous historians, myself included, have focused on the ways in which
the language of Protestant activism invited American women to exercise
public authority and have explicated the religious character of womens
patriotism.28 That many antebellum Protestants, both defenders and oppo-
nents of womens political rights, argued that Christianity had offered
women the highest possible status is a fascinating and complex question for
another time; so are the ways in which, throughout the world, women
become political symbols during times of state-building and nation-forma-
tion.29 This rhetoric, while gendered, also framed the way American reform-
ers defined Americanness itself. Let me offer a few examples from an
array of social movements, and suggest that we listen closely to these activ-
ists words. My point is not to measure the religiosity of specific move-
24 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Memorial to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, quoted in Davis, ed., Antebellum American Culture, p. 234. As president, of course,
Andrew Jackson took a much different view of the best policy toward the Indians and instituted their
speedy removal from native lands. Jackson, Second Annual Message (1830), quoted in Davis,
Antebellum American Culture, p. 240.
25 Quoted in Marty, Pilgrims in their own Land, p. 180.
26 Catharine Beecher, Treatise on Domestic Economy (1841), in Jeanne Boydston, Mary Kelley, and
Anne Margolis, The Limits of Sisterhood: The Beecher Sisters on Women’s Rights and Woman’s
Sphere (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 130.
27 Amanda Porterfield, Mary Lyon and the Mount Holyoke Missionaries (New York: Oxford, 1997), p.
20.
28 Ibid., p. 14.
29 See, for instance, the collection edited by Valentine M. Moghadam, Gender and National Identity:
Women and Politics in Muslim Societies (London: Zed Books, 1994).
334 Histoire sociale / Social History
ments. I want instead to point out how social movements Christian
assumptions helped to shape national identity and thus define who was
within, and who outside, the mainstream of national life.
Social activists who were not among the dominant classes insisted on
their own belonging and rights as Americans by drawing instinctively on a
Christian consensus. Disfranchised since 1839, African-American men in
Pennsylvania organized to regain their political rights, declaring in 1848,
We do not make our appeal to you as christian sects, or political parties, but
as men  christians and republicans  beseeching you to apply the same
principles and practice to us as religion and republicanism dictates should
belong to others....30 Labour reformers, too, blended religious and political
ideals, as when, in 1832, Samuel Whitcomb assured a group of New
England workers, That by which we judge the poor, industrious common
people, bears the mark of a christian origin, [while] that intended for the
opulent and elevated, shows a strong resemblance to Mahometanism.31
Decades later, Uriah Stephens of the Knights of Labor encouraged workers
to become educated in political economy so that members become thor-
oughly informed as to their rights as citizens, both in the abstract or higher
laws of God, and legally, or in the present laws of the land.32 Beginning in
1912, the American Federation of Labor supported the Men and Religion
movements Labor Forward programme of union revivals to shore up sup-
port and renew members zeal with a Christian condemnation of capitalists
who would deny wage-earners a decent living.33 The union label is a reli-
gious emblem, declared the Garment Worker. It is a religious act to buy
goods to which this label [is] attached, an act blessed on earth and honored
in heaven. Others insisted that labour agitators were the true followers of
Christ and are struggling to establish upon earth the kingdom of God.34
30 Appeal to the Voters of Pennsylvania, in the Minutes of the State Convention of the Coloured Citi-
zens of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Merrihew and Thompson, 1849; reprint Philadelphia: Historic
Publication #228, 1969), p. 9.
31 Quoted in Teresa Anne Murphy, Ten Hours’ Labor: Religion, Reform, and Gender in Early New
England (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 65. This is a huge literature, but see, for
example, Bruce Laurie, Working People of Philadelphia, 1800–1850 (Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sity Press, 1980); Paul Faler, Mechanics and Manufacturers in the Early Industrial Revolution, Lynn,
Massachusetts, 1780–1860 (Albany: State University of New York, 1981).
32 Quoted in Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States (New York: Interna-
tional Publishers, 1947), p. 437.
33 Elizabeth and Kenneth Fones-Wolf, Trade-Union Evangelism: Religion and the AFL in the Labor
Forward Movement, 19121916, in Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., Working-Class
America: Essays on Labor, Community, and American Society (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1983), pp. 154, 168. So implicit are Christian assumptions that, after noting that Samuel Gompers
was not at all religious, the Fones-Wolfs argue that he supported the campaign as in line with legit-
imizing of the workers Christian dignity (p. 160). See also Herbert G. Gutman, Protestantism and
the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age, in his Work, Culture and
Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), pp. 79117.
34 Fones-Wolf and Fones-Wolf, Trade-Union Evangelism, p. 169.
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Historian Mari Jo Buhle has pointed out that small-town, American-born
women brought the religious assumptions and rhetoric of the temperance
crusade to the socialist movement. As one Oklahoma woman put it, I am
fifty-one years of age but I am with the Socialists to help pull down Satans
ranks and build Gods kingdom here on earth.35
As Whitcombs reference to Mahometanism suggests, building a nation
means forging an us in part by establishing a them, a process in which
social movements played an important part. Antebellum social movements
helped to do the work of nation-building not by defining themselves in
opposition to the state, as has been the case among followers of liberation
theology in Latin America, for example, but by persuasively describing a
more amorphous threat to religious and secular institutions. As was so often
the case, Lyman Beecher was vigilant in alerting people to the dangers of
Catholics in their midst: This danger of uneducated mind is augmenting
daily by the rapid influx of foreign emigrants, he wrote in 1835, unac-
quainted with our institutions, unaccustomed to self-government, unaccessi-
ble to education, and easily accessible to prepossession, and inveterate
credulity, and intrigue, and easily embodied and wielded by sinister
design.36 Similarly, as I have argued elsewhere, religious and sexual infi-
delity were closely allied as enemies of Protestant social reform; indeed,
they delineated what was un-Christian, and un-American, in the antebellum
years.37 If Americans formal civic status did not require a pledge of alle-
giance to a particular religion, notions of religious respectability pervade
discussions of citizens rights, and atheists, Jews, and Universalists were at
different times and in various states prohibited from testifying in court or
running for office. Activists unwillingness to question this consensus cer-
tainly dampened some radical protest and maintained categories of exclu-
sion. Supporters of woman suffrage, for instance, insisted time and again
that they were refined and domestic and do not scoff at religion, repudi-
35 Mari Jo Buhle, Women and American Socialism, 1870–1920 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1983), p. 116. The rhetoric of conversion pervaded the socialist movement in the United States (see
for example p. 120). In more recent social movements as well, Protestant faith has joined secular prin-
ciples in articulating a national vision. When Martin Luther King, Jr., declared it part of the long tra-
dition of our Christian faith that God is on the side of truth and justice, he maintained a link
between Protestant beliefs and political ideals in a way that made it difficult to describe the Civil
Rights movement as un-American (as, for instance, Communist Party challenges to racism were not).
Kings address to the First Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change in Montgomery, Ala-
bama, in 1956, quoted in James Melvin Washington, ed., I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that
Changed the World: Martin Luther King, Jr., (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1992), p. 23.
36 Beecher, Plea for the West, p. 49.
37 See Lori D. Ginzberg,  The Hearts of Your Readers will Shudder: Fanny Wright, Infidelity, and
American Freethought, American Quarterly, vol. 46 (June 1994), pp. 195226, and  Pernicious
Heresies: Womens Political Identities and Sexual Respectability in the Nineteenth Century, in Ali-
son Parker and Stephanie Cole, eds., Women and the Unstable State in Nineteenth Century America
(Lubbock: Texas A & M Press, 2000), pp. 139162.
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ate the Bible, nor blaspheme God.38 With the exception of the Jew and self-
declared infidel Ernestine Rose, few suggested that Christianity should be
irrelevant to the granting or withholding of political rights.39
In addition to the Catholics, African Americans, and Native Americans
who numbered among the actual outsiders within the United States, social
reformers focused a great deal of rhetorical attention on the fearful trio of
Jews, Turks, and infidels against whom protestants and patriots needed
to gird themselves.40 Identifying this group as a serious danger was numeri-
cally absurd; we can understand the fear they evoked only if we shift to the
international perspective of Christianity, through which lens they were a
global other that threatened the larger American/ Protestant mission.
United States Protestants described the special threat posed by Turks, or
Mahomedans, terms that subsumed all Moslems in lurid descriptions of non-
monogamous marriage, the veiling of women, lechery, and a backwards reli-
gion. When American reformers wished to prove that Christianity had
granted women their greatest rights, they employed a pervasive character-
ization of Islamic societies as backward and particularly degrading to
women.41 The sad story of womans wrongs, where the true God is not
worshiped, is, or should be, familiar to my fair readers, remarked a writer in
the Ladies’ Repository, who went on to praise missionaries redemption of
their sisters from the servility and degradation of paganism.42 Underscoring
these assertions of religious superiority was a defence of Americans own
moral standards, civil inequalities, and economic disparities.
Having Jews, Turks, and Infidels exemplify the global threat to Chris-
tianity made it simpler to view the political authority and sexual practices of
religious outsiders within the United States, such as Mormons, as dangerous
to the nation. Rhetorically, the two were inseparable. As Ian Tyrrell notes,
Not only did the American WCTU attack polygamy at home with ferocity
equal to that dealt the institution abroad, but temperance women also used
the same language to describe Mormon practices that they devised for hea-
thens abroad. ... Mormonism was, stated a tract approved by the WCTU,
38 The Knickerbocker, 3/8/54, quoted in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn
Gage, History of Woman Suffrage (1881; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1969), vol. 1, p. 611.
39 For a rare antebellum defence of a true separation of Christianity from government (and of womens
rights) see Elisha P. Hurlbut, Essays on Human Rights (New York: Fowler and Wells, 1848).
40 The latter phrase is Beechers, Plea for the West, p. 62.
41 Rupp, Worlds of Women, p. 58. The emergence of a Western discourse against veiling is a fascinating
story in this context. As Leila Ahmed notes, the English Lord Cromer, a founder of the Mens League
for Opposing Woman Suffrage, campaigned against the veil, arguing that it symbolized womens deg-
radation. Veiling ... became the symbol now of both the oppression of women ... and the backward-
ness of Islam, and it became the open target of colonial attack and the spearhead of the assault on
Muslim societies. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), chap. 8, p. 152.
42 Ladies’ Repository (April, 1841), p. 122.
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The Islam of America.43 Tyrrell has argued convincingly that a moral and
cultural imperialism attached to American womens temperance crusade,
although he describes it as ironic that the efforts of the WCTU became
enmeshed in the extension of European values and in the domination of large
portions of the globe by the imperial powers.44 I would suggest that this
was not an accidental or ironic meshing, but that the mission of Protestant
conversion and American civilization were always and inextricably related.
For God, Home, and Humanity was the WCTUs motto, as its activists
went about initiating movements for woman suffrage in New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, and, more surprisingly, Japan. For them, as for both their converts and
their opponents, Protestantism, temperance, and the rights of individual citi-
zens signified Americanism itself. Consider Leila Rupps observation that,
when international womens meetings opened with a public prayer, [it was]
a practice objected to not by women from different religious traditions but
by European Christian women who found it an expression of Anglo-Ameri-
can culture.45
And so it was. Just as many eighteenth-century Native Americans first
associated Europeans with their religious customs, if one lived outside the
United States before the middle of the nineteenth century, the first American
one would likely see was a missionary. By centurys end, the Board of For-
eign Missionaries of the Presbyterian Church supported more than 1,200 for-
eign missionaries and nearly 6,000 native workers.46 These missionaries
represented, in Gail Bedermans words, a discourse of civilization [that]
linked both male dominance and white supremacy to a Darwinist version of
Protestant millennialism ... [and that] had been rooted in American culture
for centuries.47 The lessons of civilization that they offered  of hard
work for individual gain, temperance, private property, female sexual and
economic subordination, distinctions between the deserving and undeserv-
ing poor, and white supremacy, as well as republican political principles 
constituted a nearly seamless fabric with Protestant and American culture in
all areas of life.
Social Movements, Social Change
Exploring how a global religious identity helped shape the United States as a
nation shifts how we understand the specific histories of social movements
themselves. Recent historians of American social movements, largely sym-
43 Ian Tyrrell, Woman’s World, Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in Interna-
tional Perspective, 1880–1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 140141.
44 Ibid., p. 4.
45 Rupp, Worlds of Women, p. 56. In Ontario, according to Mariana Valverde, the WCTUs motto was
For God and Home and Native Land. Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral
Reform in English Canada, 1885–1925 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), p. 58.
46 Coleman, Presbyterian Missionary Attitudes, p. 12.
47 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United
States, 1880–1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 2526.
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pathetic with reformers, tend to stress the radical implications of their efforts,
especially when reformers organized to end slavery, demand womens rights,
establish utopian communities, or organize on behalf of labourers and the
poor. An international lens complicates this, sometimes uncomfortably. For
example, historians generally accept Garrisonian abolitionists righteous
(and correct) charge that the movement to colonize freed slaves in Liberia
was a racist one; they view colonization largely as a tepid precursor to real
abolitionism. At the same time, historians have largely ignored abolitionists
silence regarding colonizationists more intense and immediate concern:
christianizing Africa. From the outside, these apparent contradictions are
harder to miss. To immigrants, the irreligious, non-Protestants, or foreigners,
American social movements sought to impose American civilization on peo-
ples, lands, and nations outside their cultural or political domain, all justified
as a mission sanctioned and supervised by God.
Certainly religion, in the antebellum era and beyond, has served radical as
well as conservative goals.48 Women, the enslaved, workers, and colonized
peoples  many have found in religion both a source of dignity and a man-
date to change their society, to exercise their rights as human beings, and to
assert that they have a right to have rights. Religiously based movements
have played important roles in establishing national identities, in the emer-
gence of states, and in the granting or refusing of rights. The complex rela-
tionship between Islam and national movements in Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan,
Algeria, Turkey, and elsewhere has sanctioned both coercion and liberation,
individual rights and religious conformity, restrictions on women and oppor-
tunities for feminist advocacy.49 Throughout Latin America social move-
ment activists have at significant risk to themselves made demands on the
state on the basis of their religious identities and Christian imagery.50 These
identities serve multiple and often contradictory purposes. To oversimplify
with one example: in the United States supporters of woman suffrage
embraced the rhetoric of Christian respectability to advance their cause,
while French women did not receive suffrage until after World War II, in
part because radical politicians feared the political effects of their religious
48 For a look at my own personal scepticism about progressive religion, see The Heathen Wing: Reflec-
tions on Secular Jewish Traditions, Bridges, vol. 7 (Summer 1998), pp. 714.
49 Margot Badran argues, for instance, that modern Egypt (and the idea of Egyptness) emerged from a
complex mix of religious and secular nationalisms and a local feminist discourse and movement that
were inseparable from them both. See her Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of
Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Moghadam, Gender and
National Identity; Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam; Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the
State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Hem Lata Swarup and Sarojini Bisaria, Women,
Politics, and Religion (Etawah, India: A. C. Brothers, 1991); Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke, eds.,
Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990).
50 See, for example, Temma Kaplan, Crazy for Democracy: Women’s Grassroots Movements (New
York: Routledge, 1997).
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loyalties.51 Markedly different relations among religion, social movements,
and the state influenced these and other decisions about citizens political
rights. In the United States, religious and national identities seem to have
blended so smoothly (making Christianity, in legal scholar Stephen Feld-
mans words, the normal, the neutral, and the natural) that the story of
social movements pervasive Christianity is generally told as one that stands
apart from the emergence of the nation itself.52
If my proposed view-from-the-outside flattens the diversity of Christian
sects, the rise of religious liberals, and the challenges posed by freethinkers,
it nevertheless highlights what has been a remarkable consensus about what
constitutes an American morality. In this sense, turning an international
lens to the study of social movements in the United States is like spending a
year abroad. Both reveal how religious Americans are and how they enact
their religion in ways that are both nationalistic and nation-constituting.
Nearly all nineteenth-century observers remarked on the intense religiosity
of Americans (there was no country in the world, noted de Tocqueville,
where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of
men) and accepted that Protestantism was central to the American mission
to assert itself as the model and source of progress, modernity, and change.53
This is not to suggest that the political and legal changes that social move-
ments accomplished are unimportant. Throughout American history, ordi-
nary people have organized to demand that their nation live up to its stated
political ideals, and they have in the process gained rights and greater justice
for oppressed and excluded peoples. The wide lens of internationalism gives
those victories a more complicated meaning, however. If Protestantism has
inspired progressive social activism in the United States, it has simulta-
neously and inextricably been a force for conservatism, for establishing lim-
its to the kinds of social change that Americans consider possible, and for
declaring other moral standards and traditions outside the true faith.
The nineteenth century was of course an age of nationalism. Even as the
world, through trade, conquest, war, printing, and travel, became smaller,
states hugged their borders, educated their youth in the language of citizen-
ship, and declared national loyalties supreme. Indeed, the lens of nationalism
enables us to understand disparate bits of experience as parts of a process of
creating nations. Secular nationalists and Islamic modernists struggled over
whose vision would most closely mould an independent Egypt; in Austria
and elsewhere diverse peoples received free education at the cost of speak-
ing the language of the country, which was not, it need hardly be said,
51 Karen Offen, Women, Citizenship and Suffrage with a French Twist, 17891993, in Caroline Daley
and Melanie Nolan, Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspectives (New York: New York
University Press, 1994), p. 161.
52 Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation
of Church and State (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 266.
53 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, pp. 303304.
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their own; in western Europe and North America Jews were transformed, bit
by bit, from strangers into citizens; and the Northern victory in the Ameri-
can Civil War is commonly described as having established once and for all
the national unity of the United States.54 A great deal, of course, was lost in
that process. As Bonnie Anderson has recently demonstrated, the first inter-
national womens movement of the nineteenth century emerged in the 1830s
from a freethinking, antislavery, and socialist climate, when, in German fem-
inist Louise Ottos words, a fresh breeze blew through the world. By mid-
century a different atmosphere prevailed, as nationalism and religious ortho-
doxy permeated even the most progressive social movements.55
American historians, with a nod toward the forces of nationalism, com-
monly designate the antebellum decades as an age of reform. During those
restless years thousands of women and men joined movements to alleviate
poverty, educate children, alter drinking habits, abolish slavery and war,
establish socialist communities, and advance working peoples, African
Americans, and womens equal rights  in sum, to perfect the experiment in
human government that many believed was destined to be the most demo-
cratic and virtuous in the world. Yet what the philosopher Ralph Waldo
Emerson referred to as a fertility of projects for the salvation of the
world!56 inextricably linked that larger world to the construction of the
United States as one nation under God. This age of reform was an essential
partner to American nation-building. Nor is this lesson confined to the expe-
rience of the United States. The enduring (and often nearly invisible) confla-
tion of religion, civic life, and nation-building may offer a useful angle to
historians who examine different societies efforts to limit alcohol, educate
youth, and reform peoples sexual behaviour, in other words, to build char-
acter along with civilization. Thus, while Britains temperance movement
was surely an attempt to control the labouring classes, it was also part of that
nations more expansive efforts at building and shaping its Christian empire.
Similarly, as Bruce Curtis notes in his work on educational reform, instituting
Christian education in Upper Canada was intimately related to the process
of creat[ing] forms of civil and religious universality through educational
forms of classlessness. Much the same can be said of social purity move-
ments later in the nineteenth century. As Mariana Valverde argues, the dis-
course of moral purity was central to the consolidation of English Canada.
Canadas Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist networks of foreign missions
concentrated on expanding Christianity in China, Japan, and India, but from
54 Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 7. The quote from the 1867 Austrian constitution is
in E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848–1875 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p.
120.
55 Bonnie S. Anderson, Joyous Greetings: The First International Women’s Movement, 1830–1860
(New York: Oxford, 2000), p. 100.
56 Ralph Waldo Emerson, New England Reformers, in Essays: Second Series (Columbus, Ohio,
1969), p. 276.
The Nations Mission: Social Movements and Nation-Building 341
the beginning foreign included Native peoples in defining their national
mandate. Canadian state formation, Valverde argues, (with the important
exception of Quebec) has as one of its ideological pillars the establishment of
Protestantism as a kind of joint-stock state religion.57
Perhaps more than in other self-declared Christian countries, the bond in
the United States between national and religious identities persists to the
present time. We have but to look to discussions of prayer in schools, prohi-
bitions of flag-burning, angst over presidential sexual behaviour and citizens
moral values, appeals for volunteerism to provide for the poor, impas-
sioned debates over posting the ten commandments on schoolroom walls,
and politicians flocking to prayer breakfasts to witness the pervasiveness of
Christianity in American political and organizational life. Perched on a wave
of dislocation and uncertainty even amidst prosperity, many Americans seek
religious explanations to express their relationship to the larger society. In so
doing, they reaffirm categories designed to marginalize individuals and
groups who are thought to stand outside a shared religious and moral tradi-
tion; full membership in the nation remains dependent on notions of reli-
gious, moral, and sexual respectability defined in terms of us and them,
native-born and immigrant, Christian and other, and virtuous and deviant.
57 Bruce Curtis, Preconditions of the Canadian State: Educational Reform and the Construction of a
Public in Upper Canada, 18371846, in Norman Knowles, ed., Age of Transition: Readings in Cana-
dian Social History, 1800–1900 (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1998), pp. 252253; Valverde, The Age of
Light, Soap, and Water, pp. 115, 26.
